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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David George Conner appeals from the judgment of the district court,
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of trafficking marijuana.

On

appeal, Conner argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of the
Oregon traffic stop that led to the traffic stop in Idaho and erred by admitting
evidence regarding Conner’s suspended driver’s license, the basis for the Idaho
traffic stop.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Trooper Mills of the Oregon State Police was on duty March 5th, in
Malheur County, Oregon.

(1/22/15 Tr., p. 489, L. 24 – p. 490, L. 10.)

At

approximately 1:29 a.m. Trooper Mills stopped a red Nissan car for speeding on
Interstate 84.

(1/22/15 Tr., p. 489, L. 24 – p. 491, L. 23; see also Ex. 1.)

Trooper Mills made contact with Conner, who was the driver and only occupant
of the car. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 492, Ls. 2 – 12.) Trooper Mills ran a driver’s license
check and warrants check on Conner through dispatch. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 494, L.
21 – p. 495, L. 13.)
During the traffic stop, Trooper Mills observed several things that caused
him to become suspicious that Conner was engaged in criminal activity. (1/22/15
Tr., p. 497, L. 17 – p. 501, L. 6.) Trooper Mills stopped Conner early morning on
March 5th in Malheur County, Oregon. (Id.) Conner told Trooper Mills that he
was going to Caldwell, Idaho.

(Id.)

The car rental paperwork showed that

Conner rented the car on March 4th and the car was due back in Anderson,
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California, on March 8th. (Id.) Short rental car trips are very common for the
transportation of drugs. (Id.) The car was rented in the middle of the week and it
was a “very, very short trip.” (Id.) When Trooper Mills asked where Conner was
going, Conner hesitated and appeared to be trying to come up with an answer.
(Id.) Eventually, Conner stated he was going to visit a friend in Caldwell but did
not know the address. (Id.) People involved in the transportation of drugs do not
always know exactly where they are headed until they get close and are given an
address. (Id.) Conner also had several energy drinks and water in the car. (Id.)
Trooper Mills attempted to contact his local drug dog, but the drug dog was
unavailable. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 497, Ls. 1-7.)
Oregon dispatch informed Trooper Mills that Conner’s driver’s license was
suspended out of California. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 502, Ls. 4-16.) Trooper Mills issued
Conner a warning for his speed and gave him a citation for no “operator’s license
in Oregon.” (1/22/15 Tr., p. 504, Ls. 13-16.) Trooper Mills released Conner.
(See id.)
Trooper Mills called Trooper Klitch of the Idaho State Police and told
Trooper Klitch what he had observed regarding Conner. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 501, L.
12 – p. 502.) Trooper Mills told Trooper Klitch that Conner’s driver’s license was
suspended. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 512, L. 10 – p. 513, L. 7.) Trooper Klitch relayed
Trooper Mills’ information to Sergeant Cagle and Sergeant Tulleners. (1/22/15
Tr., p. 524, L. 17 – p. 525, L. 9, p. 559, L. 9 – p. 560, L. 17, p. 561, L. 23 – p.
562, L. 14, p. 598, L. 14 – 599, L. 16.)
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Sergeant Tulleners found Conner’s car, in Idaho, headed east on
Interstate 84, near the Middleton overpass. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 564, L. 15 – p. 565,
L. 7.) After Sergeant Tulleners pulled in behind the car, Conner took the first exit
he came to. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 567, Ls. 2-15.) Conner was driving only 45 miles
per hour in a 65 hour zone. (Id.)
Based upon the information that Conner was driving on a suspended
license, Sergeant Tulleners stopped Conner’s car. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 568, Ls. 1720.) Shortly after Sergeant Tulleners stopped Conner, Sergeant Cagle arrived.
(1/22/15 Tr., p. 569, Ls. 8-11.) Sergeant Tulleners made contact with Conner,
the driver of the car. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 569, L. 12 – p. 570, L. 6.) Sergeant
Tulleners asked Conner where he was going and Conner said he was going to a
friend’s house but, even when asked, Conner could not be more specific.
(1/22/15 Tr., p. 570, Ls. 17-22.) Sergeant Tulleners contacted dispatch to check
on the status of Conner’s driver’s license. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 570, L. 23 – p. 571, L.
12.)
Officer Cullen arrived and deployed his drug seeking K-9 while Sergeant
Tulleners was collecting Conner’s information and running it through dispatch.
(1/22/15 Tr., p. 571, Ls. 13-23.) Officer Cullen’s K-9 alerted on the back of
Conner’s car. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 583, L. 17 – p. 586, L. 7, p. 606, L. 12 – p. 607, L.
4.) The officers searched the trunk and found marijuana. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 586, L.
19 – 588, L. 3, p. 607, L. 5 – p. 608, L. 11.) The marijuana was packaged in six
vacuum sealed bags. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 586, L. 19 – 588, L. 3; Exs. 4, 5, 6.) Kerry
Hogan, a drug chemist with the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Laboratory,
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tested the marijuana and found it weighed over five pounds. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 405,
L. 22 – p. 406, L. 8, p. 454, L. 10 – p. 455, L. 6, p. 457, Ls. 20-25.)
The state charged Conner with trafficking of five pounds or more of
marijuana. (R., pp. 33-34.) Conner filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence.
(R., pp. 69-84, 108-109.) The district court denied Conner’s motion to suppress.
(R., pp. 141-164.)
Conner went to jury trial. (R., pp. 203-275.) The jury found Conner guilty
of trafficking in five pounds or more of marijuana. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 926, L. 7 – p.
927, L. 22; R., pp. 309-311.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced
Conner to seven years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 325-326.) Conner timely
appealed. (R., pp. 327-329.)
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ISSUES
Conner states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence of the Oregon
stop because it is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, and can
the State show that error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt?

II.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence that Mr.
Conner drove without privileges because it is irrelevant and
prejudicial character evidence, and can the State show that
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Conner failed to show the district court erred by admitting
evidence related to the Oregon stop?
2.
Has Conner failed to show the district court erred by admitting
evidence that Conner was stopped for driving without privileges?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Evidence of Oregon Stop Is Relevant And Not Unduly Prejudicial
A.

Introduction
Conner argues that evidence that he was stopped in Oregon is not

relevant and is unfairly prejudicial.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.)

The

district court did not err. The Oregon State Trooper, Trooper Mills, observed
evidence consistent with the trafficking of illegal drugs. (See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 497,
L. 17 – p. 501, L. 6.) Trooper Mills also discovered the evidence that directly led
to the Idaho traffic stop. (See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 568, Ls. 17-20.) Evidence of the
Oregon stop was relevant to Conner’s trafficking charge and was not unfairly
prejudicial.
B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187
(2009) (citations omitted). Whether evidence is relevant, however, is a question
of law reviewed de novo. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 919, 342 P.3d 628,
631 (2014) (citing State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d 232, 241
(2014)); State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010);
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009).
In reviewing a discretionary decision, the appellate court “examine[s]
whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the
trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal
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standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of
reason.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187 (citations omitted); accord
Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590.

“However, an abuse of

discretion may be deemed harmless if a substantial right is not affected. In the
case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on
appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”
Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
C.

Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Was Relevant And Not Unfairly Prejudicial
“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” Shackelford, 150 Idaho at
364, 247 P.3d at 591 (quoting I.R.E. 401) (additional citation omitted). “Whether
a fact is ‘of consequence’ or material is determined by its relationship to the legal
theories presented by the parties.” Id. (citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,
444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008)).
1.

Trooper Mills’ Observations During The Oregon Stop Formed The
Basis For The Idaho Stop And Supported The State’s Case

In order to prove Conner guilty of Trafficking in Marijuana (Five Pounds or
More), the state had to prove:
1. On or about March 5, 2014,
2. in the state of Idaho,
3. the defendant David George Conner possessed and/or brought into the
state marijuana,
4. and knew it was marijuana,
5. and possessed five pounds or more of marijuana.
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(R., p. 294.)
Conner argues that the evidence of the Oregon stop was “not relevant to
any fact of consequence in this case.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Conner argues
that the district court erred by allowing evidence of the Oregon stop as
“background information” and this “evidence does not tend to prove or disprove
any fact of consequence, it is not relevant and is inadmissible under Rules 401
and 402.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.) Conner argues that where he was
going and what he was doing was not relevant because it is a trafficking charge
and not an intent to deliver charge and therefore the only relevant information
relates to the weight of the drugs. (Id.) Conner is incorrect.
Relevant evidence is “any evidence having a tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See
I.R.E. 401. Evidence that a defendant is engaged in activities consistent with
trafficking in illegal drugs is relevant to a trafficking charge. See e.g. State v.
Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 520, 887 P.3d 57, 65 (Ct. App. 1994) (evidence that
defendant sent money orders to the same person within the same week as
packages were sent from fictitious people and address, was relevant because
“this evidence made it more probable that [the defendant] was engaged in
trafficking methamphetamine.”)
Here the Oregon stop, and Trooper Mills’ observations, provided evidence
that Conner was engaged in behavior consistent with trafficking in illegal drugs.
(See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 497, L. 17 – p. 501, L. 6.) The state was required to prove
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that Conner knew he possessed marijuana and brought marijuana into Idaho.
(See R., p. 294.) Trooper Mills’ observations during the Oregon stop have a
tendency to make it more probable that Conner knew he was trafficking in illegal
drugs because Conner’s actions were consistent with illegal drug trafficking.
Further, part of Conner’s defense at trial involved questioning the
credibility of the officers and their conduct during the Idaho traffic stop. (See
1/23/15 Tr., p. 874, L. 18 – p. 875, L. 3, p. 883, L. 1 – p. 884, L. 3.) The Idaho
officers had to explain why it was reasonable for them to stop Conner. The
reason why the Idaho officers stopped Conner was based upon the information
they received from the Oregon stop. (See 1/22/15 Tr., p. 501, L. 12 – p. 502, p.
512, L. 10 – p. 513, L. 7, Tr., p. 524, L. 17 – p. 525, L. 9, p. 598, L. 14 – 599, L.
16.) Without evidence of the Oregon stop, the Idaho officers’ actions would have
appeared arbitrary and capricious. As a result, evidence of the Oregon stop was
relevant.
Conner also argues the evidence of the Oregon stop was unfairly
prejudicial because it “tended to show that Mr. Conner is a dishonest and
suspicious person who disrespects the law, and thus suggests a decision on an
improper basis.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (citing State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868,
870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct. App. 2011).) “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial
simply because it is damaging to a defendant’s case.” State v. Fordyce, 151
Idaho 868, 870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct. App. 2011).

“Evidence is unfairly

prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis.” Id. (citing State v.
Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 465, 235 P.3d 409, 415 (Ct. App. 2010); State v.
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Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994)). There is nothing
about the Oregon stop that is unfairly prejudicial to Conner. The Oregon stop
does not show that Conner “is a dishonest and suspicious person who
disrespects the law.”

And even if it did, evidence of Conner’s credibility,

suspicions and attitude towards law enforcement are all fair game and this
evidence would not be unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages his case.
Conner failed to show the district court erred by holding that evidence of the
Oregon stop was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial.
2.

Evidence Of The Oregon Stop Was Harmless Because It Did Not
Contribute To The Jury’s Verdict

Even if this Court concludes the trial court erred by admitted evidence of
the Oregon traffic stop, reversal is not warranted.

The rules of evidence

expressly provide that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.” I.R.E.
103(a); see also I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).

Consistent with this

evidentiary rule, the appellate courts of this state will grant relief from an
incorrect ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence “only if the error affects a
substantial right of one of the parties.” Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d
at 590 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord State v. Ehrlick,
158 Idaho 900, 911, 354 P.3d 462, 473 (2014). An erroneous evidentiary ruling
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the verdict.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).
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Conner argues “[h]ere the State cannot show that Mr. Conner’s guilty
verdict was surely unattributable to evidence of the Oregon stop.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 13 (citation omitted).) Conner is incorrect. Officer Cullen’s K-9 alerted
on the back of Conner’s car. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 583, L. 17 – p. 586, L. 7, p. 606, L.
12 – p. 607, L. 4.) The Idaho officers searched the trunk of Conner’s car and
found six bags of marijuana. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 586, L. 19 – 588, L. 3, p. 607, L. 5 –
p. 608, L. 11; Exs. 4, 5, 6.) Kerry Hogan, a drug chemist with the Idaho State
Police Forensic Services Laboratory, confirmed that it was marijuana and that it
weighed over five pounds. (1/22/15 Tr., p. 405, L. 22 – p. 406, L. 8, p. 454, L. 10
– p. 455, L. 6, p. 457, Ls. 20-25.) Even if evidence of the Oregon stop was
erroneously admitted, such an error was harmless because it did not contribute
to the jury verdict finding Conner guilty of trafficking in five pounds or more of
marijuana. Conner was convicted because he had over five pounds of marijuana
in the trunk of his car – not because he had a traffic stop in Oregon.
II.
The District Court Did Not Err When It Admitted Evidence Regarding Conner’s
Suspended California License
A.

Introduction
Conner argues that the district court erred when it allowed evidence

regarding Conner’s suspended license to be admitted. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 1317.) Conner alleges the district court erred because it admitted this evidence
without analyzing it within the context of Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Id.)
The district court did not err.

Evidence of Conner’s suspended license was
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inseparably connected with his trafficking offense and the jury could not have
been given a rational explanation of his crime without reference to the status of
his license.
B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187; see also
supra § I(B).
C.

Evidence Of Conner’s Driver’s License Was Inseparably Connected To
The Charge That He Drove Over Five Pounds Of Marijuana In His Car
Into Idaho
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not apply to evidence of Conner’s

driver’s license. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b). An
exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of other misconduct evidence is res
gestae, or the “complete story principle,” where “the charged act and the
uncharged act are so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a
rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the
uncharged misconduct.” State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19, 878 P.2d 188,
193 (Ct. App. 1994). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State v. Izatt, 96
Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975):
The state is entitled to present a full and accurate account of the
circumstances of the commission of the crime, and if such an
account also implicates the defendant or defendants in the
commission of other crimes for which they have not been charged,
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the evidence is nevertheless admissible. The jury is entitled to base
its decision upon a full and accurate description of the events
concerning the whole criminal act, regardless of whether such a
description also implicates a defendant in other criminal acts.
See also McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (7th ed. 1999) (“other-crime evidence
should be admissible to complete the story…when the material in question is
necessary to a fair understanding of the behavior of the individuals involved in
the criminal enterprise or the events immediately leading up to them.”) (footnotes
omitted).
Here, evidence of Conner’s driver’s license is inseparably connected to
the trafficking charge and without evidence of Conner’s driver’s license
suspension, the jury could not be given a rational complete presentation of the
crime and the police officer’s conduct.

Conner was only able to commit the

trafficking offense by driving on his suspended license.
In addition, the reason the Idaho officers stopped Conner was because
they received information that his driver’s license had been suspended. (See
e.g. 1/22/15 Tr., p. 568, Ls. 17-20.) The only way the jury could have been given
a logical explanation of how Conner was caught with five pounds of marijuana in
his trunk would be to admit evidence related to his driver’s license.

This is

especially true because part of Conner’s defense at trial involved questioning the
credibility of the officers and their conduct during the Idaho traffic stop. (See
1/23/15 Tr., p. 874, L. 18 – p. 875, L. 3, p. 883, L. 1 – p. 884, L. 3.) The officer’s
motives and credibility were at issue and the jury was entitled to hear a full
explanation of what they did and why.

Since evidence of Conner’s driver’s

license was inseparably connected to the charged offense, trafficking five
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pounds of marijuana in his car, it is res gestae and is not impermissible 404(b)
character evidence.
Even if Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) applied, this rule would not prohibit
the state from introducing evidence of Conner’s driver’s license. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 404(b) prevents “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” from
being admitted “to prove the character of a person in order to show that the
person acted in conformity therewith.”

I.R.E. 404(b).

Evidence of Conner’s

driver’s license was not admitted to prove Conner’s character in order to show he
acted in conformity with that character. The status of a driver’s license has
nothing to do with Conner’s character. Nor was the state attempting to prove
anything about Conner’s character nor would Conner’s character have anything
to do with the trafficking charge.
Finally, even if 404(b) applied, evidence of driving on a suspended license
would be admissible because 404(b) evidence can be admitted to prove
“opportunity.”

See I.R.E. 404(b).

Conner had the opportunity to commit

trafficking only because he was driving on his suspended license in his rented
car. No matter how it is examined, the district court did not err by admitting
evidence that Conner’s driver’s license was suspended.
1.

Evidence Of Conner’s Driver’s License Was Harmless Because It
Did Not Contribute To The Jury’s Verdict

Even if the district court erred, the error was harmless. An erroneous
evidentiary ruling is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute
to the verdict. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974. The jury did not find
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Conner guilty of trafficking because he was driving on a suspended license – the
jury found him guilty of trafficking because the Idaho officers found over five
pounds of marijuana in the trunk of his car. See supra § I(C)(2).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 7th day of June, 2016.

__/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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